Published in Journal of Indian History, University of Kerala, Vol XL, part 1-3, 1962, pp. 269-286
The port of Surat on the western coast of India figures prominently in the development of early English trade in the country. It was at Surat that the first English ships arrived soon after the formation of the East India Company. In 1609 Captain William Hawkins arrived on the 'Hector' at Surat and proceeded from there to Agra to seek an agreement with the Emperor Jahangir to ensure favourable conditions for English trade in India. In spite of initial difficulties in establishing an amicable and continuously harmonious relationship with the local authorities at Surat, English trade 'throve' and by 1620 had assumed a form sufficiently significant to influence the economic history of Western India. It is the purpose of the present paper to examine closely the nature and extent of this trade and to analyse its influence on the economic history of Western India during the first half of the 17th century.
It has been generally assumed that the real impact of English trade in India was first felt in Eastern India and especially in Bengal. Though the beginnings of this impact are traced to the early part of the 19th century, it was not until the middle of that century that this impact becomes significant enough to be reckoned as a factor in the economic transformation that determined with the critical relationships in the country. Considerable work has been done on the subject of the economic history of Bengal and the adjacent areas in the context of foreign trade. Western India, has not been so fortunate in attracting significant notice from economic historians. The reasons for this are many. First of all, the period during which Western Indian trade largely assume importance was the time when the Mughal Empire was at the zenith of its power. The great Akbar has his first personal political encounter with the Portuguese in 1573 when he met the Portuguese envoy, Dom Antonio de Noronha. During 1590 and 1594 Akbar entertained as many as three Jesuit - from Goa and the motives on both sides of the encounter was partially political. The reign of Jahangir (1605-1627) and Shah Jahan (1628-1658) have been generally described as the noon time of Mughal Empire. Aurangzeb’s vigorous annexationist policies in Western India were evidence of the strength of the Mughal empire though discerning observers then could not have failed to recognize signs of the impending doom casting its lengthening shadows over that, impressive edifice. But it is contended here that in spite of its brilliance and obvious strength, the economic foundations of the Mughal dominions in Western India were already being affected throughout the 17th century. Secondly, it may be argued that even though English trade first began in Western India, it was not until the beginnings of English operations in the Eastern areas of the country that the real economic impact England on India was felt. After all the rich agricultural areas lays in Oudh, Bihar, Orissa and Bengal and it was only when English control over these areas was secured that the real economic revolution in Indian history could be said to have begun. But as will be shown in what follows, the transformation began much earlier, and that too in Western India, when the English took over the control India s foreign trade, not only with Europe, bit in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf and the Southeast Asian areas. The economic history of Western India in the context of foreign economic penetration should, therefore, be examined much more closely than has been done hitherto.
Some eighteen years after the formation of the East India Company in 1600, there were English factories at five places in India and in were in Western India namely, at Ahmedabad, Burhanpur (in Khandesh), Broach and Surat. The English also set up trading posts, staffed with agents at Baroda, Nausari, Ghoga, Dabhoi, Cambay and several other places. In spite of numerous. difficulties created by adverse Mughal policies and opposition of traders at Surat, the English trade prospered and led to an increase English control on the mercantile life of Western India throughout the half century under review.
During the opening decades of the 17th century Western India carried on a rich trade with the Red Sea area as well as places in Southeast Asia. Indian merchants frequented Mocha, Busra, Achin and other places selling their cargoes in these areas during the rainy season in India and returning to India during September-November each year. The main products of the Mughal. Empire which found a ready outlet in exports were indigo, cotton, wool, silk, carpets and calicoes and other sundry items? Besides these, spices carried to Surat from other parts of the country as well as from Southeast Asia were exported from Surat. Thus on March 6, 1619, Thomas Kerridge at Surat asks William Martin at Broach to buy sixty mounds (about 1950 lbs. avoirdupois) of cardamoms without delays from about 1618 onwards, tobacco also figures prominently in the list of cargoes sent by the company. This is certainly a new crop in India agricultural history. Tobacco seems to have been unknown to Akbar’s officers. It reached India probably through the Portuguese and India in Gujarat where it is noticed for the first time in 1613. The Mughal policy was adverse to the use of tobacco as Jahangir prohibited smoking in 1617 but this had little effect on the spread of habit, since by the time of Aurangzeb, it had become a general habit. And thus, as Moreland points out, a new and profitable commercial crop had been established. There are numerous reference to export of India tobacco on board the English ships and it must therefore be supposed that the cultivation of tobacco in Western India had already assumed a significant form of economic activity by 1620. Among the other goods, mention may be made of sealing-wax, turmeric, gum-lac and green ginger. But the most usual goods sent to England were drugs, spices, raw silk, indigo and calico.
As for England's trade in India, the widest scope existed for luxury goods. Muqrab Khan advised Sir Thomas Roe that the English carried too much cloth and bad swords and scarce an else, and therefore advised to forbear two or three years, and rather bring such rarities as China and Japan, afforded, which would be more acceptable; and from England the best cloth of gold and the richest silks wrought with wrought with gold and silver, but above all a good quantity of Arras hangings. England exported considerable quantities of woollens, tin, lead and quicksilver, ivory from Africa, coral from the Mediterranean, amber from the Baltic, sword blades and knives and jewels for which the largest mark; was the Mughal court. Sword-blades were much in demand in the Deccan due to the increased incidence of war. As Lipson observes, the trade in cloth, lead and tin in the 17th century was the 1 observe, asthetouchstone whereby the wealth of England is tried.
The rapid rate at which English trade with India expanded is by the fact that between 1601 and 1613 there were 12 indicated by fact that between 1601 and 1613 there were 12 separate voyages. The earlier journeys took over six months for Thomas Best journeyed from England to Damon in 1612 in 6 months and 7 days. But there are instances of longer period’s months. The Persian journey, however, took much less upto 10 time for a ship leaving Surat on November 1, 1618 could reach Jask on November 22 and leave Jask on December 12 of the same year and return to Surat on the 10th of January 1619. This was of great benefit to the English in taking over the inter-area trade as will be shown later.
Almost from the beginning of English trade with India Surat figured as the most important port on the Western coast: Thomas Aldworth, the chief factor at Surat, wrote on January 25, 1613 of the importance of - Surat in the following words: “the fountain-head from whence we may draw all the trade of our East Indies; for we find here merchandise which we can take and sell in nearly all parts of these Indies and also in England”. The Portuguese resented the English intrusion but their efforts at preventing the English from trading at Surat were not successful. And the Factors indicated that the gain to the English Treasury from trade at Surat amounted to some 200,000 crowns every year. The Rev. Patrick Copland almost grows lyrical in praise of Surat and its trade when he says that the establishment of the factory at Surat was much benefit to the worshipful company and all English Nation for “the land is very healthful and fertile” and abound in rich commodities. It seems like another Egypt, or to say better, a terrestrial Paradise; such is its abundance in all earthly things. By February 1616, Surat was designated as the head factory for Mughal Empire. Sir Thomas Roe spoke of Surat as great harbour, conveniently located for the European as well as Asian trade. As the English and Dutch trade prospered Surat grew while the Portuguese possession Goa declined in its economic prosperity. The English clergyman quoted above writing in 1613 says Surat hath stones and brick house, faire, square, flat-roofed; goodly gardens, with pomegranates, pome citrons, lemons, melons, figs, continuing all the years, with curious springs of fresh water. The people are grave, judicious, neat, tall, and goodly clothed in long white calico or silk robes. The increased volume of trade at Surat by October 1620 is indicated by an interesting list of cargo kept ready for England. These included 1200 churles of Indigo pieces (156,000 lbs. ay.); 12000 pieces of broad baftas (pieces of cloth from 12 to 15 yds., long by less than 3/4 yd. broad), 24000 pieces of dutties (coarse, strong cotton cloth from which dhoties were made); 60,000 pieces of narrow baftas, semianoes (piece-goods) and carpets.
Broach was perhaps next in importance only to Surat for the English trade in Western India. The city- specialized in the washing and bleaching of calicoes which were sent there from the sur. rounding districts. Broach also supplied a number of commodity to the English factory at Surat for its trade with the Red Sea and Southeast Asian areas. Indeed the Surat-Broach area held out such fine prospects of commercial activities that in 1620 - Thomas Kerridge and other factors at Surat protested against the contemplated reduction of number of factories and recommended that number be increased The demand for Indian cotton goods was increasing very rapidly. As Thomas Mun argued this trade in calicoes was singular use, for this commonwealth in particular herewith to increase the trade into foreign parts; but also thereby, greatly to abate the excessive prices of Cambricks, Holland, thereby and other sorts of linen-cloth; which daily are brought into this a very great sum of money. And indigo was found to be excellent and almost indispensable for the dying of English woollens.
As trade developed and the English factors secured greater experience of the process of buying commodities it was inevitable that factories and trading- posts be opened further inland. Such agencies were opened at Ahmedabad and Baroda especially for the purchase of calicoes. And in September 1635 as much as Rs. 10,000 were invested in Agra and the neighbouring districts for the purpose of trade.34 Baroda held great prospects of supplies for the Red Sea trade and in November 1621 Richard Barber and Justinian Offley at Baroda complained that they had only 6000 Mahmudis on hand which was a small amount for employing 800 workmen. (A Mahmudi was priced around 4 shillings at that time) .35 It is interesting to note here the large number of workmen employed at Baroda. It may be surmised that all these workmen must have been employed by the English Factors to manufacture under their personal supervision the commodities needed for export by Surat. If the surmise is valid then this interesting reference throws light on the changes in the organization of production brought about under the impact of English trade. Production in India was often small-scale production with each family engaged in participating in an involved and complicated process which could be undertaken only through decentralised production. But the English needs were such as to demand production on a significantly large-scale and in one place where it could be controlled by the Factors or their agents according to measurements and patterns most in demand for the overseas market. The Indian production was aimed at the domestic market and the needs of this market were different from the foreign market. As will be shown later in the course of this presentation this method of organising production on a large scale as well as the growing demands for Indian textiles in the markets had important repercussions on the Indian market.
Finally we may notice in passing the efforts made by the English to escape both the vagaries of Mughal officials at Surat as well as the hostile attitude of the Portuguese by attempting to established factories farther down the coast southwards in Western India. One such spot under serious consideration was Dabhol on the Konkan coast. As early as February 1618 Thomas Kerridge thought of trade possibilities at Dabhol. A communication of February 16, 1618 contains Sir Thomas instruction for cargo for Dabhol and later in November 1619, we find opinions expressed that Dabhol had profitable prospects for cargo English trade opinions with the Red Sea area. Discussion then went on about the possibility of the English opening a trade post at Dabhol and it was pointed out that “the Portuguese have no great trade at Dabhol, yet keep a factory there to assist their merchants that come and give license to the Moor's navigation. The profit by the end of our English commodities would defray the charge of a factory at Dabhol”. A monthlater,when the English were forbidden from selling coral in Surat by the Mughals, the English attempted to dispose it off at Dabhol. As the Red Sea trade assumed increasing importance the English also considered opening an agency at Chaul, near Bombay, for Robert Jeffries at Cloll Road writing to the Company on October 5, 1621 said that there should do well to establish a factory, there, where many of our commodities would vend, both cloth, coral, lead, elephant teeth, whose proceed we might invest in goods proper for Red Sea, Persia and England.
Though the East India company primarily established to carry trade with India and Southeast Asia the exigencies carp of its financial situation, especially in the context of the prevailing of theories against the export of gold from England, inevitably led it to take over the inter-area in the Eastern Waters. This had it to take economic repercussions for the Indian trading community. Since ancient times, Indian traders frequented the ports of the he Red Sea-Persian Gulf and the Indonesia-Malaya areas and sold Indian merchandize much in demand there. These merchants disperse to Mocha, Basra, Persia and Achin during the rains in India and return to India during September-November of the same year to invest once again in merchandize for sale abroad: But from 1550 onwards there was a drastic change in this pattern of trade in Indian hands. The initial English attempts directed at carrying on trade with the Persian ports were rebuffed by the treatment meted out to Sir Henry Middleton in 1610-11. It was Sir Thomas Roe who was largely responsible for the revival of these attempts. He was alarmed at the small demand for English goods in India which led to a drain on English silver necessary for the purchase of Indian commodities- for the English markets. Consequently he suggested the establishment of a branch trade between Surat and the Red Sea where spices from Bantam and assortments of English and Indian goods could be sold at very profitable rates to the merchants from Egypt who mostly paid for their Asian purchases in spices. Roe wrote: in November 1616 “My counsel is that one of your smallest shops with the fittest English goods and such other as this country yields yearly go in company of the Gujaratis and trade for them-selves for money, which is taken in abundance and return in September with them, to supply this place. This profit exceeds all the trades of India and will drive this alone”. This profit ranged from 30 to 110 per cent which fact alone would have made the trade very attractive.
The preparation for this takeover of inter-area trade from Indian hands was set into motion in part by the then Portuguese policy of insisting on Indian ships that they carry Portuguese passports for safe-conduct on the high seas. For this a stiff price had to be paid. The advent of the English was not looked upon unfavourably by the Indian traders since it was expected that the Indians could work out some arrangements with the English for the escorting of their vessels and cargo under the protection of the English Flag. Roe advocated that the English undertake the work of convoying Indian ships to the Red Sea and back for pre+ against the Portuguese who charged something like 3000 for a pass for one vessel. This suggestion was soon put into practice for we hear in October 1619 of the Company's petition to Prince Khurram (future Shah Jahan) speaking of English ships escorting Indian ships to the Red Sea. The Mughals, however, might they might have been on land, were powerless on the seas and. since quite a few of them were interested in trading on their own account, must have found the suggestion rather tempting Foreign Travellers like William Finch had noted that Jahangir’s mother and others as well as the Empress Nur Jahan had invested considerable money in trade with the Red Sea area: And the merchants of Surat had the most important financial stake in this trade. This English intrusion was naturally resented by the Portuguese who sometimes attacked English ships carrying goods to Mocha. But the English soon learned how to take care of themselves against these threats. They also used their superiority on the high seas to intimidate Indian shipping and the Mughal authorities from time to time importance of this inter-area trade was understood, , the English at Surat were not slow to take steps to take it over from Indian hands. They carried Indian cloth, sugar, pepper Indian to a variety of assorted goods for sale in the Middle Eastern area and the Southeast Asian archipelago and imported astern goods from Persia into India. These references clearly show that throughout the half century under survey the clearly show English had steadily taken over the Indian trade both north and eastwards as well as south and eastwards. Normally if the English had stuck to their original intention of pursuing the trade between India and Europe the Asiatic trade would have remained in Indian hands. What this meant in economic terms has been indicated by Bal Krishna who estimates that £ 100 first invested at Surat could bring £ 300 in the Moluccas, which reinvested at Bantam or Surat for the home market could produce £ 900 in England. This English intrusion resulted in the English taking over not only the Asiatic trade but also the carrying trade of the Indian Ocean area from Indian hands and this had a profound effect both on the economy of the Indian West Coast and on the profession of ship-building. And the advantage to the English of this whole trend of change in the control of India's foreign trade is described by Thomas Mun as "the great revenue of the King; the Honour of the Kingdom; the Noble Profession of the Merchant; the School of our Arts; the Supply of our wants; the Employment of our Poor; the Improvement of our Lands; the Nursery of our Mariners; the Walls of the Kingdom; the Means of our Treasure; the Sinews of our War the Terror of our Enemies".
Originating in the need for the conservation of English silver this trade, then, emerged as a factor of far-reaching consequence to both the English and Western India. As Roe himself reported the merchants of Surat reacted in dismay to this change for he says: “The merchants of this place are also undone by our trade to the southwards which has taken (as we may term it) the meat out of their mouths and overthrown their trade that way. Since our coming this port is undone, which in their grief they spare not sometimes to tell us”. And Foster the takeover of the trade with Southeast Asia what way the Indian trade was the Red Sea trade and when that too was left taken over the economic penetration of Western India by the East India Company in the early 17th century had proceeded indeed.
The other aspects of the English impact on Western India during the first half of the 17th century may now be examined This appeared in the area of foreign investments. At the time when theEnglishbegan to operate in the area English trade he had already become internationalized. As Lipson states: the English “native produce was not limited to a national market; it furnished also the needs of an international market” and that “After the discovery of America and of a fresh sea route to India, the products of this country ceased to be confined to a very small part of the earth-Europe and Asia Minor; henceforth they found their way to the hemisphere in the West and to the Empire of the Mogul in the east. This spectacular increase in foreign trade brought with it a strong ability to invest overseas in trade and commerce and a considerable part of this investment was involved in the English operations in Western India”. For the first decade (1601-1610) the total value of English exports to, the Indies is estimated at 170,875 or 17,085 per annum. Between 1600 and 1612 there were in all 12 voyages which netted an average profit of 138% on the capital employed in all the voyages. The trade during the next decade (1611-1620) than, grew to more so fourfold over the volume for the first decade. This expansion naturally meant growing English investment. We have some random figures of moneys invested at various places which gives us an idea of the magnitude of this investment. A communication of January 1620 mentions the interesting fact that as many as 1,015,000 mahmudis were available with the English factors in Surat, Ahmadabad and other places. Taking one Mahmudi as being equal to one English shilling the figure works out to over 50,000. And this is not an isolated instance for we have an instance of a year's fleet in 1618 spending 12,120 Mahmudis that instance 606. In 1619 the Company at Surat spent some 39,623 is over goods for shipment to England and Southwards. Besides this on the considerable private trade carried on by servants of the Company must have resulted in the expenditure of other substantial amounts in Surat and elsewhere. Of the Rials sent with the fleet in February 1620 some 163,956 were landed at Surat for investment there. With the Rial of Eight then standing at 5 Shillings this amount works out to some 40,989.64 between 1615 and 1629, 27 ships left Surat. These represented purchase of cargo worth more than £ 695,260.65. During 1632-1633 some five ships sailed for India with cargo worth 62,000 and another 164,000 in cash. We have information on investments for another period of 15 years between 1630 and 1645. During this period some 22 ships carried cargo worth over 652,290 from the port of Surat.
The figures quoted above represent substantial English investments in the markets of Western India. These investments must have produced their own impact which affected the economy of the area in several ways. They meant, in the first instance, a significantly increased demand for Indian goods in foreign markets which must have led to the expansion of production. In cases where this expansion of production was not proportionate to the demand for goods, it inevitably led to inflated prices. Such an occasional tendency is reflected in the correspondence of the times. In his letter of February 14, 1618 Roe reported: “There is no complaint the Mogul's subject that we buy not their commodities, but contrary that we buy so much that their own merchants want the Red Sea. I know it true we have raised the price we deal in and now we fear that the Dutch will make it for later it is found that the export of Indian cloth by the Indian affected trade so much that the weavers of Broach organized a boycott protesting against the large purchase cotton yarn by the English. This led to an increase in the Price of yarn which hurt the Broach weavers themselves.
This large trading and Investment tended to break down the isolation of the western Indian markets. The English bought not only at Surat and Broach but also far inland at places like Agra, Burhanpur, Patna and Samana in the Punjab. This naturally affected the price structures prevailing in areas of the count, separated by long distances from one another. The provincial art; regional markets, English trading also influenced the fluctuations in the market rates of the various currencies in use in Western India making these fluctuations almost international. Under this impact, tended to lose their isolator, and appeared to assume a quasi-national character. This internationalization of the money market was perhaps one of the most important aspects of the early English economic impact in Western India.
The Company's activities also influenced the economic life of the area in another way. Being in possession of large amounts in cash from time to time the Company was in a position to give gift (bribes) to Mughal officials as also to loan money to them. A communication of November 30, 1621 speaks of Himmat Khan. The Mughal governor at Ahmedabad borrowing Rs. 800 from the Company's agents there which was indeed "a sorry sum for governor to borrow" But more important than such occasional loans to Mughal officials was the fact that a new class of Indian merchants was coming into existence. This was the class of agents and brokers who worked for the Company and by their association with foreign trade and traders amassed sizable fortunes. The Factory bro Records mention a number of such agents and brokers.
Among these were Janoji Modoji, Ramrikhbhai and Tapi Das, the last being perhaps the chief broker at Barodaya. Then there the one Nathu Shah who was sharaf (money-changer or banker) was operated principally in Ahmedabad and Surat. In October 1619 agreed to provide money to the English in Ahmedabad understanding that this would be repaid in Surat. From Surat he agreed to go to Agra for transacting some business for the English. In Patna the English worked through a broker called Makhan. Three brokers worked at Agra and were called gashi, Bisheshar and Dhanaji. In Burhanpur there was Hiraji. In Cambay the English depended on Vishnudas to lend them money which could be repaid in Ahmedabad. Tskandar, either a Muslim or an Armenian Catholic, worked as a broker and an interpreter in Surat. These brokers were paid brokerage ranging from 1/2 to 1 per cent.
The most outstanding among these agents and traders in Western India was undoubtedly Virjee Vohra. He figures prominently in the records of the English Factories. He was so important that he was given courteous receptions in all English ships visiting Surat. Vohra, or Vohra as his name is spelt, was rightly reputed to be the richest merchant in Asia of his days and his first mention occurs in 1619. He bought and sold gold, silver, lead, coral, ivory, spices, opium and cotton and many other commodities besides. He conducted business on a very large scale and he and his agents were in a position to buy entire cargoes of ships visiting the Western Indian ports and thus practically control the whole market of Western India. His business ramifications were wideandnumerous and we find him even financing a voyage to Burma projected by the East India Company. The Company borrowed heavily from Vohra and the rate of interest charges seems to be from ½% upwards. Being in a position to control markets and a was in a position not only to dictate his own terms to the foreign trades but also invite the unfavourable attentions of the Mughal officers. He seems to have lived up to 1677.
The growth of this class of merchants and bankers whose prosperity depended so much upon foreign, and more especially English trade, was a new phenomenon in Indian economic history. These merchants were in a position to mobilize large amours kits of capital and invest them in the markets as also in production of goods. The Jagat Seths of northern India rose into prominence in the 18th century, that is a century after the rise of Virji Vohra and his colleagues in Western India the loyalties of this class were not on the side of the Mughals whose commercial generally adversely affected the interests of the Hindu merchant and financiers. These classes were interested primarily in amassing riches and would support any group in a position to safeguard peace and enforce law and order. The rise Maratha power under the great Shivaji directly threatened the prosperity Surat which was sacked twice by the Marathas (1664 and 1670). In the course of the first raid the properties of Virjee Vohra suffered great losses. Hence it was no wonder that when the English acquired Bombay in 1667, and were able to demonstrate that they were able to safeguard their possession against attacks, many rich merchants as well as skilled artisans transferred themselves to Bombay. Shivaji's attacks on Surat practically brought the prosperity of that port and the surrounding areas to an end and it was 1101 until a hundred years later that the economic processes initiated fir in Western India could be repeated and completed and that too in Bengal.
What were the Mughal Government's reactions to such momentous changes in the economic life of one of their richest Provinces? Sir Thomas Roe’s encounter with Jahangir was not as fruitful for the Company as was desired by the factors at Surat Prince Khurram, the later emperor Shah Jahan, was frankly suspicious of English and Aurangzeb (1658-1707) was occasionally hostile. The main causes of friction were based on English acts of piracy and the take-over of the Red Sea trade with the red sea trade by the English. There were instances when the Indian merchants petitioned the Emperors against the grant of permission of trade with the Red sea area to the English. But in spite of the protests of Indian merchants and the hostility of the Mughal power of English succeeded in taking over the Indian trade with the Red sea area as well as with Southeast Asia. This was because of their superiority in ships and their fire-power and better commercial organization. In 1601 one of the 4 ships sent under James Lancaster mounted some 40 guns and each other’s had 24 guns. By 1676 the Directors of the Company required that all ships of 500 tons and more carry 24 guns and a resolution of 1677 allowed 28 guns to a three-decker. And the organization of the Company, especially after the initiation of the Joint-stocks, was something far ahead of mercantile developments in India of those days.
The loss of Asiatic trade made the English economic penetration in Western India almost inevitable. There was resentment especially against the trade in Persian coral for which there was great demand at the Mughal court as well as in the Deccan. At the behest of Indian merchants the Mughal emperors issued orders prohibiting English trade from India with the Red Sea area. But this could always be either flouted openly or skilfully circumvented. As a last resort the English could always bring pressure to bear on the merchants of Surat by threatening to divert their trade to Ahmedabad, a possibility which could not be considered with any degree of equanimity by the Surat merchants as it meant great financial loss to the city. Even the attempts made by some Mughal dignitaries to monopolise trade in important commodity like indigo ended in failure. Thus Shah Jahan made trade ?3 a Indigo a monopoly and entrusted its control to a merchant caliell Manohardas in 1633, but this was dissolved two years later as result of protest and threats of mercantile reprisals by the En g-141 and the Dutch. These instances clearly go to indicate that the English, inspite of frequent complaints about the difficulties of trading with the Mughal Empire, had achieved a significant degree of economic penetration in the life of Western India in the first half of the 17th century. This process could have finally led to political changes and the English flag could have supplanted Mughal authority in Western India in the 18th century as did the English trade replace Indian control over Asian trade. This did not happen because of the rise of the Marathas in the rich Western India trading areas which bottled up the English possession in Bombay until 1775, practically destroyed the prosperity of Surat by 1670 and temporarily put Western India out of the English orbit. The Maratha power thus prevented English advances in Western India at least for a century. And by that time the English had already discovered the advantages of commerce and con-quest in the southern and eastern parts of the country.
But the impact, while it lasted, was indeed revolutionary. It created new demands for Indian goods, brought into operation new patterns of large-scale commercial production, shattered the isolation of the local markets, created fluctuations in currency and prices, threw up a new class of merchants and bankers symbolised in the enormous wealth of the people like Virjee Vohra and demonstrated to the Mughals that their weakness on the high seas was only more obvious than their lack of control over domestic, markets even when they were at the zenith of their military and Political power. It was in Western India, therefore, that the first signs of the economic and political revolution which finally to the establishment of the British Empire were witnessed.